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Abstract 
Islamism or the so-called political Islam is conceptualized as a 
socio-political rather than a solely religious phenomenon. 
Inherently characterized by a singularly defined religious concept 
of purity and a clear-cut distinction between “we” and “them”, it 
manifests into a various form of activities where “terrorism” is 
the most violent one. Following a series of terrorist attacks in the 
country, the Indonesian government through The National 
Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) launched a de-radicalization 
program that aims to restrain and combat religious radicalism 
and “terrorism”, particularly through its “stick and carrot” 
approach. Despite its success story in pacifying some terrorist 
activities in the country, the program is severely criticized for not 
dealing with the root causes of terrorism. It is also considered 
counter-productive as it creates resistance and hatred toward the 
state for specifically targeting Islam and, therefore, it provides 
incentives for religious radicalism and terrorism. The research 
conducted in Yogyakarta Province found that Islamism spreads 
and gains acceptance in certain sections in public through certain 
social channels and agencies. However, this paper argues that the 
existing cultural virtues and local wisdom could create social 
resilience against such radicalization process. 
[Islamisme atau yang biasa disebut dengan Islam politik 
dikonseptualisasikan sebagai fenomena sosial-politik dan bukan 
semata-mata agama. Secara inheren dicirikan oleh konsep religius 
yang murni tentang kemurnian dan perbedaan yang jelas antara 
"kita" dan "mereka", itu termanifestasi ke dalam berbagai bentuk 
kegiatan, di mana "terorisme" adalah yang paling kejam. 
Menyusul serangkaian serangan teroris di negara itu, pemerintah 
Indonesia melalui Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme 
(BNPT) meluncurkan program deradikalisasi yang bertujuan 
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untuk menahan dan memerangi radikalisme agama dan 
"terorisme", terutama melalui "tongkat dan wortel" pendekatan. 
Terlepas dari kisah suksesnya dalam menenangkan beberapa 
kegiatan teroris di negara ini, program ini sangat dikritik karena 
tidak berurusan dengan akar penyebab terorisme. Ia juga 
dianggap kontraproduktif karena menciptakan perlawanan dan 
kebencian terhadap negara karena secara khusus menargetkan 
Islam dan karenanya, memberikan insentif bagi radikalisme 
agama dan terorisme. Penelitian yang dilakukan di Provinsi 
Yogyakarta menemukan bahwa Islamisme menyebar dan 
memperoleh penerimaan di bagian-bagian tertentu di depan 
umum melalui saluran dan lembaga sosial tertentu. Namun, 
artikel ini berpendapat bahwa keutamaan budaya yang ada dan 
kearifan lokal dapat menciptakan ketahanan sosial terhadap 
proses radikalisasi tersebut.] 
Keywords:  Islamism, radicalism, terrorism, local wisdom.  
 
Introduction 
The series of current religiously motivated terrorist attacks remind the 
world of the two-sided coin of religion: peaceful and violent element. 
Following the 9/11 attacks, the world came into a common word of “war 
against terror” in which religious radicalism, mostly “Islamist terrorists”, 
becomes a main target. Indonesia, as the world’s Muslim largest country, 
is also positioned at the frontline of this war. It is not only because a 
number of terrorist attacks targeted the country but also because 
Indonesia is a “fertile ground” for terrorist networks to grow and evolve. 
Being fully aware of that, the Indonesian government took significant 
efforts to deal with terrorism. After long studies and assessments, in 2010 
the government officially launched a non-ministerial department called 
The National Counter Terrorism Agency (later written as BNPT in this 
paper) whose first mandate is to cope with terrorism. Since the beginning 
of its establishment, the agency showed the public its success story of 
uncovering terrorist networks as well as seizing their actors in Indonesia. 
Through its special force called Densus 88 (the special task force 88), BNPT 
successfully convinced the public on its efficient “stick and carrot” 
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approach in dealing with terrorism. In some cases, the actual siege and 
military attacks by Densus 88 toward those suspected terrorists, most of 
which ended up with the deadly shots of them, were broadcasted live on 
TVs or widely covered by national newspapers.  
Despite its success story, BNPT is, nevertheless, criticized for not 
properly tackling the roots of terrorism. It is mainly based on the fact that 
the agency failed to cut off the terrorist networks in Indonesia which 
continued to develop and mutate its radical ideology into new cells and 
various agencies. In addition, Indonesia is still considered one among 
countries that are vulnerable to religious radicalism and terrorism. A 
survey conducted by Lazurdi Birru (2010) showed that Indonesia’s 
vulnerability to radicalism and terrorism is 43, 6%, which is still relatively 
high. The survey was conducted in 33 provinces using indicators such as 
radical acts and attitudes, jihadism, Islamist agenda, supports toward 
radical organizations. The survey by PPIM UIN Jakarta (2015) also found 
out that religious radicalism in Indonesia have reached out larger segments 
of societies leading, therefore, to a more religiously conservative landscape 
or what the so-called a ‘conservative turn’.  Therefore, rather than a “stick 
and carrot” approach which provides only an ad hoc answer, “war against 
terror” in Indonesia requires a holistic and comprehensive strategy for 
which Islamism as a concept could be best used for tools of analysis. 
Islamism or the so-called political Islam is conceptualized as a socio-
political, rather than a solely religious phenomenon (Mozaffari, 2007). 
Inherently characterized by a singularly defined religious concept of purity 
and a clear-cut distinction between “we” and “them”, it manifests into a 
various form of activities where “terrorism” is the most violent one. In 
Indonesia, economic and political instability, globalization and Western 
policies toward Muslim countries contributed to the growth of Islamism, 
in addition to other factors at psychological and individual levels, which 
emerges as an alternative solution for its supporters. Using Islamism as an 
umbrella term, this paper attempts to provide an analysis of Islamic 
radicalism and terrorism by focusing on its narratives which gains its 
resonance among various agencies. Halverson (2011) defines a narrative 
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as “coherent system of interrelated and sequentially organized stories that 
share a common rhetorical desire to resolve a conflict by establishing 
audience expectations according to the known trajectories of its literary 
and rhetorical form.” Accordingly, the narrative approach is used in this 
article in order to figure out how Islamism spreads among the agencies 
and, therefore, their vulnerability to religious radicalism and terrorism as 
well.  
Yogyakarta was chosen as the locus of this research for several 
reasons: Yogyakarta is the heart of Javanese culture which is well known 
for its permissiveness toward foreign elements. It has a long history with 
Islamic radical groups who are in contestation with syncretic Islam. Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), for example, was declared in Yogyakarta on 
August 7, 2000, during the 51st celebration of Islamic State of Indonesia 
(NII) (Turmudi & Sihbudi, 2005). Its strategic position as a destination of 
urbanization strengthens the city’s multi-ethnic and religious diversity of 
the people who become more polarized. Being declared as a city of 
education, thousands of youth coming from different regions in Indonesia 
are studying in different universities in the city. As the Sultan of 
Yogyakarta himself admitted (Shidqi, 2008), the socio-religious landscape 
of Yogyakarta is currently undergoing changes that endanger its “city of 
tolerance” identity due to several religiously nuanced intolerance and 
terrors by some religious groups.   
Therefore, it is interesting to examine how the state deals with the 
spectrum of Islamism in Yogyakarta. As this paper will point out later, 
“De-radicalization Program” nationally launched by BNPT to some extent 
creates resistance and hatred toward the state for specifically targeting 
Islam and, therefore, it provides incentives for religious radicalism and 
terrorism. However, the existing cultural virtues and local wisdom in 
Yogyakarta can create social resilience through which the de-radicalization 
program may be best channeled.  
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Mapping Islamism in Yogyakarta: A Narrative Approach 
This section attempts to map the narratives of Islamism which spread 
and receive social acceptance in Yogyakarta. The informants were selected 
from different backgrounds which represent various segments of societies 
in Yogyakarta. By using the matrix of Islamism, i.e. militancy, radicalism, 
extremism, and terrorism this section examines how Islamism is reflected 
into narratives among the informants. However, it is important to note 
here that these categories are not closed ones, rather overlapped to each 
other. Militancy refers to intolerance and commitments to take a distance 
from others who are considered unbelievers or deviants. Radicalism 
assumes desires and aspirations toward the radical change of political or 
social systems through the establishment of an Islamic political order. 
While these two categories do not necessitate violence for the aspired 
changes, extremism transforms into violent acts because of impatience for 
changes. Terrorism is the peak of Islamism where it involves systematized 
tactics or strategies to impose immediate changes by uses of violence and 
terrors (Noorhaidi et. al., 2013).  
Yogyakarta is a multi-ethnic society where Islamism is in day-to-day 
contestation with different ideologies. Even though Yogyakarta is well-
known as a city of tolerance, it nevertheless shows intolerance or at least 
passive tolerance toward the others. Intolerance, defined as unwillingness 
or incapability to accept others’ different faiths, is reflected on theology as 
an identity marker when getting along with non-Muslims. Meaning to say, 
tolerance toward others is encouraged as long as it does not touch 
theological aspects. The Quranic verse (109: 6)1 constitutes the basis of 
tolerant attitudes toward others. In the informants’ words, “we are fine 
getting along and cooperating with non-Muslims as long as it is only at 
social and not theological levels.” 
However, this lazy tolerance does not distinguish clearly the 
boundaries between what is theological and social. In many cases, the two 
are confused and overlapped to each other. Consequently, the seemingly 
                                                          
1 QS. al-Kafirun [109]: 6.  
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tolerant attitudes transform into intolerance at a practical level. Asked 
about the establishment of churches, for example, most informants said 
that churches should not be established in places where the majority is 
Muslims. The same attitudes found its fuel as Islamization in Yogyakarta 
is getting stronger. "Hanya Menerima Kost Muslim (Rent for Muslims Only)” 
or “Hanya Menerima Kost untuk Muslim Berjilbab (Rent for Muslim Women 
with Hijabs Only),” are easily found in front of rent houses in Yogyakarta.  
This lazy tolerance explains also why narratives of anti-
Christianization are not as strong as those toward allegedly deviant Islamic 
sects such as Ahmadiyah and Shi’ah or even liberal Muslim group such as 
JIL. “Ahmadiyah Sesat (Ahmadiyah is Deviant)” or “Shiah itu Sesat (Shi’ah 
is Deviant)” are freely distributed or displayed in forms of posters or 
pamphlets. Unlike narratives of anti-Christianization, these hatred 
narratives toward those “deviant groups” in many cases transformed into 
physical violence by some radical groups who justify their terrors under 
the name “purification or fortification of faiths.” Ironically, these terrors 
also targeted universities where intellectual freedom should be nurtured. 
Radicalism in Yogyakarta is closely related to the narrative of an 
Islamic political order as an alternative to democracy. It idealizes an 
Islamic state or khilafah as a solution from world problems. Some 
informants believe that khilafah is necessary and it is only a matter of time 
for its establishment. Muslims, they believe, are religiously obliged to 
prepare conditions or incentives for its coming.2 The narrative of khilafah 
goes in line with the necessity for Muslims to implement Islam in a 
comprehensive way (Islam Kaffah) the integral parts of which are applying 
shari’ah and the establishment of an Islamic state or Khilafah Islamiyah. This 
is only by doing so that Muslims will recover from their current problems.  
The above narrative is common among those who are affiliated with 
Islamist groups such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) which strives to the 
                                                          
2 Interview, September 30, 2013.    
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establishment of an Islamic state or Khilafah.3  It is interesting to look at 
the answers from the informants who are not affiliated with similar 
groups. As this research found out, even though they show positive 
attitudes toward an Islamic political order, they nevertheless do not 
automatically reject democracy or Pancasila as the formal ideology of 
Indonesia. Unlike the first group, these informants, most of them are 
young Muslim activists, said that shari’ah is applicable only in forms of 
national legislation (formalization of shari’ah) rather than an Islamic 
political order or Islamic state.4  
Extremism is characterized by the use of violence to realize Islamists 
visions. Radicalism transforms into extremism when it involves violence 
as the only way to change the situation considered against their idealized 
values or principals. Cultural values and strong civil societies in Yogyakarta 
do not give wide space for extremism in Yogyakarta. Being aware of the 
fact that Islamist violence strategy to change the current political order will 
attack the cultural foundations of the city, which are tolerant and anti-
violence, Muslim radical groups alternatively switch to issues which are 
less theological and most people will likely buy such as pornography, 
lesbianism and so the likes. Under the term amr ma’ruf nahy munkar 
(enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong), Islamist radical 
groups are trying to create a common word to justify their violent acts. 
A number of violent acts and intimidation by Muslim radical groups 
were recorded in Yogyakarta. On March 20, 2011, Indonesia Islam Forum 
(FUI) sealed the quarter of Ahmadiyah in Kotabaru. On May 09, 2012 
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) attacked a book discussion by Irshad 
Manji in Center for Studying Islam and Societies (LKiS). In addition to 
physical attacks, there were also intimidation and terrors by Islamic radical 
groups, particularly to Muslim sects who are considered deviant from “the 
true Islamic doctrine.” Ironically, such intimidation and terrors targeted 
                                                          
3 Noorhaidi Hasan, The Making of Public Islam Piety, Democracy and Youth in Indonesian 
Politics (Yogyakarta: SukaPress, 2013), 48.   
4 Interview, October 05, 2013.  
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also universities and study centers where intellectual freedom should be 
given spaces. The most current case is on terror toward the movie 
screening titled Senyap at State Islamic University (UIN) Sunan Kalijaga.  
In 2010, Yogyakarta people were shocked by the bombing at the front 
of Syuhada Mosque. In 2013, Densus 88 arrested two suspected young 
terrorists, Muhammad Syaiful Sabani and Bayu Dwi Aryanto, in a hotel 
around downtown. Unlike extremism which found its grounds through 
the grand narratives of amr ma’ruf nahy munkar in Yogyakarta, terrorism 
gains no acceptance at all among all the informants. For them, terrorism 
is not part of Islam and it derives from a misinterpretation of jihad. 
Nevertheless, our research shows that this grand narrative is expressed in 
different responses which in some cases are ambiguous as they entail 
rejections and sympathy at the same time, blaming terrorism upon 
‘external enemies’ such as western policies and Zionist conspiracy.5  
The question is then how the narratives of Islamism, with all its 
variants, spreads and gains its acceptance? To answer this question brings 
us to the relations between Islamism and its agency. Though the agency is 
personal, it is nevertheless shaped by the corresponding social settings.6 
This research examined how Islamism disseminates in different social 
settings in Yogyakarta where universities, schools, and mosques are among 
the main loci. 
In many universities, preaching institutions in campus or the so-called 
Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK) plays a very significant role. These young 
Muslim organizations are found in either “secular” or Islam based 
universities.  Their activities, which aim to establish “pious and true 
Muslim communities” particularly among young Muslim students, are 
built upon the belief that practicing Islam Kaffah (the holistic Islam) is the 
only solution for moral and political problems. Shariatization or 
Islamization for them refers to behaviors according to the Quran and 
                                                          
5 Interview, July 09, 2013. 
6 Read Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977).  
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Hadith which quite often they understand them in a literal manner. They 
see Islam as an ideology which should reflect in any aspects of Muslims, 
including politics. Therefore, it is no wonder that they see ideology other 
than Islam as un-Islamic and, therefore, should be rejected. These young 
Muslim militants are very active in recruiting members through their 
regular activities and are mostly though not officially affiliated with larger 
political movements such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera (PKS).   
Islamism also infiltrates through the LDK as well as it goes under the 
Islamic education sections or Kerohanian Islam (Rohis) in schools. In line 
with similar research by the Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural 
Studies (CRCS), Universitas Gadjah Mada,7 systematic efforts of 
“Islamization” in schools are reflected in their extracurricular activities. 
They also use bulletin boards as well as social media such as Facebook, 
Twitter, Youtube, or Blogspot. Like LDK, members of Rohis are 
connected to each other in a network called Inter-Rohis (Farohis) consisted 
of members and alumni of Rohis in each school. Mosques are also pivotal 
places for growing Islamism in Yogyakarta. It intertwines with an 
ideological polarization of mosques by Islamist groups in Yogyakarta.8 
According to Qadir’s ideology based categorization, the mosques in 
Yogyakarta are divided into moderate, political, formalist-sharia, and 
variant-puritanical. Each of which reflects on the colors of Islam.   
BNPT: Foe or Friend?  
Established in 2010, BNPT was mandated by the Indonesian 
government to deal with terrorism in Indonesia. BNPT declared war 
against terrorism which becomes a real threat particularly after 9/11 and a 
series of bombings in the country. It is hard to deny the achievements of 
BNPT, along with Densus 88, which successfully covered up the terrorist 
networks and caught their members. There are two main responsibilities 
                                                          
7 Read Hairus Salim, et. al, Politik Ruang Publik Sekolah (Yogyakarta:  CRCS UGM, 
2011).  
8 Read Zuly Qodir, "Islam Kampus dalam Perubahan Politik Nasional: Studi Keislaman 
Masjid Kampus di Yogyakarta", Jurnal Muqaddimah, Vol, 18, No. 2, 2012. 
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of BNPT in pacifying terrorism: enforcement and prevention. While the 
first takes the forms of “carrot and stick” approach in dealing with 
terrorists, the second involves into what so-called the national-wide “de-
radicalization” program.9  
Despite its success story, BNPT creates another problem which 
seemingly is counter-productive with its initial goals. Even though it is 
strongly and continuously rejected by the agency, in fact some Indonesian 
Muslims or Islamist groups accused it of targeting Islam. This is based on 
some controversial actions and policies by BNPT which are deemed as 
making Islam as the enemy. BNPT, through Densus 88, was criticized for 
treating the terrorists and those suspected terrorists inhumanly: most of 
whom were deadly shot. Live reports by national media and videos on 
social media such as Youtube containing deadly attacks of Densus 88 
against the suspects also fueled public rage and stirred demands for its 
disbandment. Harsh criticisms also came from human rights 
organizations, social activists, and also religious leaders.   
The de-radicalization program creates resistance toward BNPT from 
some Islamist groups. For those groups, the de-radicalization program is 
an organized attempt to discredit Islam and, therefore, should be rejected. 
There were some cases where BNPT was criticized and even stirred 
demands for its dissolutions. In 2012, BNPT initiated a certification 
program for Islamic teachers which then almost all Islamic organizations 
and leaders strongly rejected: they also released a controversial statement 
that there are around 30 radical pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) in 
Indonesia. The most current and controversial issue, following the threats 
and recruitments of ISIS members in Indonesia, was the closing of around 
ninety Islamic websites due to their allegedly radical contents. This creates 
                                                          
9 According to Ansyaad Mbay, as quoted by Zuhdi, the de-radicalization program aims 
to give a proper understanding of Islam, particularly on the meaning of Jihad. Read 
M. Harfin Zuhdi, "Fundamentalisme dan Upaya Deradikalisasi," RELIGIA Vol. 13, 
No. 1, April 2010, 92.   
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controversy and harsh criticism and, again, insistence on the dissolutions 
of the agencies speaks louder.  
The resistance toward BNPT is closely related to the agency’s 
ideological approach in dealing with terrorism. Ansyaad Mbay, the head 
of BNPT, said that “Terrorism was rooted in radical ideology which takes 
the name of Islam.” Even though the ideological approach turned to be 
effective in reducing and limiting spaces of terrorist attacks in Indonesia, 
it failed to prevent the evolution and transformation of terrorist networks 
into new cells. Reducing numbers of terrorist attacks may not indicate that 
they have been successfully swiped out or destroyed. Rather, they 
transform into new cells and new strategies. Therefore, a more cohesive 
and long-term counter-terrorism is necessary. 
Social Resilience: from Ideological to Cultural Approach 
The decreasing numbers of religiously motivated terrors in Indonesia 
at one point are good news and an indication of successful counter-
terrorism by the state. Sidney Jones, for example, stated that the counter-
terrorism program in Indonesia is one of the bests in the world. However, 
as indicated in the previous section, Islamism has potentials in it through 
which terrorists are recruiting their new members through ideological 
indoctrination. In a long term, cultural approach based counter-terrorism 
can best serve a protection from their radical and extremist ideology. 
Yogyakarta may serve the best example. Being well-known as the 
heart of Javanese culture, the existing cultural values and wisdom become 
social capitals which can create social resilience against radical and 
extremist ideologies. Franz Magnis Suzeno mentioned that tolerance and 
respect for each other are ethical values, upon which Javanese world-views 
and ethics are built. These two principles of life become philosophical life 
of Javanese people as reflected in their motto “tata tentrem tata tur raharja” 
which literally means a harmonious and well-ordered life.10 This is why 
                                                          
10 Frans Magnis Suseno, Etika Jawa: Sebuah Analisa Falsafi rentang Kebijksanaan Hidup 
Jawa (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2001), 38.  
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Yogyakarta national-wide branded with its friendly attitude toward cultural 
and religious differences (the city of tolerance).   
The tolerant faces of Yogyakarta can be historically traced back to 
three phases. Firstly, from its initial establishment as a Mataram Sultanate 
in 1756, Yogyakarta had been in open and harmonious encounters with 
different world cultures and religions. Secondly, in 1945-1949 when it was 
declared as the capital of the Indonesian Republic, Yogyakarta became a 
melting point of different ideas among the national and religious figures. 
In 1949, Yogyakarta declared its status as a multicultural society as young 
people of different regions and ethnicities were coming to the town to 
study at the oldest university in Indonesia, Gadjah Mada University, which 
was established in 1949.11 These three historical phases largely contributed 
to the tolerant characters of Yogyakarta.  
Although Yogyakarta is currently facing the rising tide of Islamism, 
its existing cultures and local norms provide social capitals by which 
societies can prevent themselves from violent forms of Islamism. A social 
and cultural mechanism such as Javanese rituals (e.g. nyadran, ruwatan, and 
kenduri) can strengthen social cohesion and solidarity which limits spaces 
for the growth of ideology based alienated groups. A strongly charismatic 
personality in Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono XI constitutes also as “a local 
hero” who stands at the front line of multiculturalism along with other 
moderate Muslim leaders. As a center of education, Yogyakarta also 
provides a strong basis for the education of multiculturalism in schools 
where children are taught how Islam is supportive of multiculturalism and 
against terrorism. Yogyakarta is also rich with numbers of civil societies 
who promote tolerance and anti-violent movements. Working together, 
these social capitals would be able to build contra-narratives against the 
spread of violent imported ideologies such as Islamism. 
                                                          
11 Herry Zudianto, Kekuasaan sebagai Wakaf Politik: Manajemen Yogyakarta Kota Multikultur 
(Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2008), 51-65. 
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Conclusion 
Well-known as a city of tolerance, Yogyakarta is currently facing the 
rising tide of Islamization, especially in mosques, schools, and universities. 
This new development brings the region into more polarized societies of 
different religious and ethnic groups. This religious symbolism oriented 
development also put religion as a marker of identity where tolerance 
toward others is demarcated by theological terms, creating what the so-
called a lazy tolerance. Fueled with religiously motivated hate speeches, 
this kind of lazy tolerance is potentially leading to violent forms of 
Islamism. 
Infiltration of radical Islamist groups into public space can transform 
religious militancy into radicalism or even violent forms of Islamism 
(extremism and terrorism), particularly when joining with illusive dreams 
offered by those groups. The appeals of religious radicalism usually lie in 
the belief that Muslims today are undergoing setbacks and helplessness 
due to their ignorance of shariah, lack of solidarity or unity among Muslims, 
and conspiracy of what the so-called “enemies of Islam.” This is not to 
mention also poverty, corruption and other social problems which 
become an integral part of the radical groups’ campaign in recruiting their 
members. 
Resistance towards de-radicalization and counter-terrorism program 
by the state also indicates that ideological approaches, even though very 
successfully in its enforcement efforts, should go hand in hand with 
cultural ones if the program wants to give more long-lasting impacts. Even 
worse, this gap in fact provides fuels for radical and terrorist groups to 
continuously spread their narratives of anti-government and “back to 
shariah” or violent jihad as the only solution. 
Yogyakarta, which is the heart of Javanese culture, has rich social 
capitals to anticipate violent forms of Islamism. Javanese philosophy of 
life, traditions and local wisdom in the region could be an effective 
medium to fight radicalism and terrorism. In addition, the number of 
peace-making groups, interfaith organizations and other similar civil 
societies can largely contribute to the program of the state. 
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